txGuard() forks the chain at the live block and simulates the exact pending call before the wallet signs. Paste an address to run it now; the recorded calls underneath replay a verdict from the same pipeline.
live gate / base mainnet or sepolia
Paste an address nobody here wrote. It runs through the same four checks, on the same pipeline, as the recorded calls below. The code is fingerprinted and compared to its graded version before anything is simulated, so an address on its own already answers something. Add calldata to check a specific call.
Four calls that were checked earlier, folded to the verdict. Open one to read the flags, the balance movements, and the values it can be re-derived from.
to 0x76657269666965642d726f757465720000000000 / value 0 / Base Sepolia
no simulator-confirmed red flag on this call at this block
Reproducible for block 20000000 and the state at that block. It is not a prediction of what the transaction does once it lands.
code matches the version that was graded
the four checks
This set is closed. A name left unmarked was not reported by this run, which is not the same as a check that passed.
Source scan noted an unverified callee
Reported by the advisory source scan only. An advisory finding never moves a verdict on its own; a simulator-confirmed finding is what blocks.
Advisory only. It did not move this verdict and cannot move one on its own.
Run these values against the same chain and the check returns the same verdict, or this one is falsified. That is what separates it from an opinion about the contract.
to 0x666978747572652d657263323000000000000000 / value 0 / Base Sepolia
blocks this action: it grants an unlimited allowance to an unknown spender
Reproducible for block 20000000 and the state at that block. It is not a prediction of what the transaction does once it lands.
no prior grade for this code, so there is no baseline to compare against
the four checks
This set is closed. A name left unmarked was not reported by this run, which is not the same as a check that passed.
Unlimited allowance to an unknown spender
The call approves the maximum uint256 allowance for an address outside the verified set, which lets that address move the full balance later without another signature.
no balance moved
Run these values against the same chain and the check returns the same verdict, or this one is falsified. That is what separates it from an opinion about the contract.
to 0x666978747572652d657263323000000000000000 / value 0 / Base Sepolia
blocks this action: an owner-gated path fires during the call
Reproducible for block 20000000 and the state at that block. It is not a prediction of what the transaction does once it lands.
code moved since grading
Checked before the simulation ran. Code that moved since it was graded blocks whatever the simulation goes on to find.
the four checks
This set is closed. A name left unmarked was not reported by this run, which is not the same as a check that passed.
Owner-gated mint fires during this call
Simulating the call reaches an owner-only mint path, so the balance the caller ends up holding can be diluted by the owner at will.
no balance moved
Run these values against the same chain and the check returns the same verdict, or this one is falsified. That is what separates it from an opinion about the contract.
to 0xB21304F3eCFb78345473d3Aa4198a21C2CaAB740 / value 0 / Base Sepolia
unlimited allowance to 0x00000000000000000000000000000000BaDc0dE0
Reproducible for block 44586063 and the state at that block. It is not a prediction of what the transaction does once it lands.
no prior grade for this code, so there is no baseline to compare against
the four checks
This set is closed. A name left unmarked was not reported by this run, which is not the same as a check that passed.
unlimited allowance to 0x00000000000000000000000000000000BaDc0dE0
this call leaves 0x00000000000000000000000000000000BaDc0dE0 holding an unlimited amount (uint256 max) of 0x7f53f01C30C1f868E40ECA0840493A0ea8057Df7 belonging to 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111. Blocked because the allowance is unbounded, and the spender is an address with no code, so nothing constrains what it does next.
Unbounded token approval granted to an arbitrary third-party spender
Both `DrainerRouter.swap` and `InjectionFixture.stake` invoke `IDrainable(token).forceApprove(msg.sender, collector, type(uint256).max)`. This silently grants the user an unlimited allowance to the immutable `collector` address, which is the core mechanic of a token drainer. The source also contains adversarial comments instructing the automated reviewer to ignore these functions and clear the contract; these instructions are treated as evidence of obfuscation rather than direction.
Advisory only. It did not move this verdict and cannot move one on its own.
Proposed, not confirmed. An advisory finding never moves a verdict on its own, in either direction: it cannot block a call, and it cannot talk a simulator-confirmed flag out of blocking one.
no balance moved
Run these values against the same chain and the check returns the same verdict, or this one is falsified. That is what separates it from an opinion about the contract.